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ABSTRACT 
Production of weapon systems has proven to be as difficult as their development. The transition 
from development to production encompasses innumerable efforts to take a weapon system from laboratory 
into full-scale production. These efforts may span the development and production phases and constitute 
a maior determinant of a weapon system's production costs. Besides, Indian manufacturerslproduction 
unit;, who seek know-how, generally go to foreign manufacturers and obtain complete production know- 
how. Obviously, they expect same kind of technological support, which are the preserves of the 
manufacturers'. An attempt has been made for the first time by Defence Research & Development Laboratory 
(DRDL), Hyderabad for a technology transfer of highly sophisticated missiles to production agency. 
Experiences show that the technology receiver (i.e. production agency) should have a willingness to 
receive the technology and the technology donor should understand the culture of technology receiver 
and recodelrestructure the technological information to fit into the technology receiver's domain. Production 
planning and preparations were conducted throughout the development phase to identify production 
reauirements and to resolve the difficulties before production begins to achieve quality products. A 
. . . .  
un~que ~cchnology transfer mechan~sm hnc hecn csolved and ~mplemcnred successfully for one of the 
wedDon svstcms dc\cloncd hv DKDL. Hvderobnd Product~on naencles have demonstrated the~r capab~l~tv  
. , . > 
to produce subsystems of a weapon syAem of desired quality-within the time schedule and cosi by thk 
time the weapon system performance was demonstrated to the users. Also, the deliveries of systems 
of development hardware continued into the production phase and production deliveries began with no 
line interruption. 
Keywords: Technology transfer, weapon systems, production agencies, weapon system development, full-scale 
production, missiles 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
No model or mechanism. des~aned for successful 
- 
technology transfer has been proposed as on today. 
Conventional techniques like technology transfer 
- ~ 
by passive mode, active mode, semi-active mode 
and technology diffusion are not applicable for 
transfer of advanced technology and highly sophisticated 
weapon systems. The authors are of the opinion 
that, 'technology transfer for weapon system should 
mean the transfer of entire content of knowledge 
and transfer of hardware and know-how to manage 
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resources, infrastructure, plan product, maintain 
balance between technical concerns and production 
concerns and finally productionise and successfully 
impart training in operation and deployment of weapon 
system'. 
Technology transfer is besieged with many 
hurdles whlch may include lack of  efficient path 
from raw material proucurement and manufacture 
to deployment. If these hurdles are not addressed, 
a number of solutions will never reach deployment 
stage and will result in an ineffective path of technology 
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transfer and form poor operational performances. 
Technology transfer activities should commence 
right fromthe inception of the project. Studies by 
Kunihikol suggested a four-stage technology transfer 
process whereas Junzheng and Jaideep7 suggested 
a five-stage technology transfer process from 
manufacturer-to-manufacturer (public sector to private 
sector) which includes many participants as shown 
below: 
(a) Provision of technology: Technology providers 
can be universities; national laboratories (industries, 
agriculture, and medical research laboratories, 
space research laboratories, atomic energy 
laboratories, defence research laboratories, etc.); 
research divisions in public sector and private 
sector units, foreign companies Cjoint venture) 
and consulting firms. 
(b) Kinds of technology: Technologies provided 
by universities and laboratories are mostly 
hardware- oriented, short-term-oriented incremental 
technologies and long-term-oriented innovative 
technologies. Software technologies (information 
technologies) are provided by consulting firms. 
(c) Search for technology: Interested companies 
conduct search for needed technologies. Consulting 
firms are best referred to for searching the 
technologies, because they have better access 
to information. Besides, contract research and 
expert services can also give good results for 
searching new technologies. 
(d) Negotiations for conditions between provider 
and buyer: Technology transfer mechanism could 
be either through contract research, research 
projects, generating on user demand (based on 
user reqirement) joint ventures and patents, 
and licenses. 
Acquisition of technology: Acquisition of 
technology mainly depends upon the role of 
the provider and the buyer. Technology can be 
acquired through memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in the form of absorption technology, 
adaptation technology and adoption technology. 
This is either from Govt laboratories or from 
private sectors. Once the aforesaid stages (a, 
b, c and d) are complete, technology transfer 
will take place from the provider to the buyer. 
Usually, the acquisition process takes long time 
because of many uncertainty factors. Also, it 
depends upon the capability of the provider of 
technology and adoption and absorption of the 
transferred technology by the buyer. 
(f) Service and support: Provider of the technology 
should help the buyer to understand and apply 
the technology, bearing in mind the protection 
of intellectual property rights associated with 
the technology transfer. The product produced 
should be maintainable throughout its life 
cycle.  
Experiences have shown that production of 
weapon systems has proven to be as difficult as 
their development. The transition from development 
to production encompasses innumerable efforts to 
take weapon systems from laboratories into full- 
scale production. These efforts span the development 
and production phases and constitute a major 
determinant of a weapon system's production costs. 
Technology transfer is a person-oriented phenomenon, 
and therefore culture forms an integral part of 
technology transfer and its success depend upon 
a close relationship between the parties involved 
to overcome transfer barriers. 
Conventionally, weapon system acquisition 
cycle constitutes a concept exploration, demonstration 
and validation of design, full-scale development 
and production, and deployment. Each phase precedes 
a management review and the experiences show 
that the last phase of production continued several 
years to achieve the desired rate of production as 
well as filling the inventory. This is mainly because 
of the following technical problems: 
The pressure to achieve technical performance 
dominates the development phase 
Design employing advanced technology 
encounters more problems--needs management 
attention 
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Delays in setting up production facilities and 
equipment 
Lack of strong integrator/multi-function team 
in multidisciplinary and multi-production agencies 
environment 
Lack of strong des~gn and development base 
in production units to absorb and adopt new 
technologies 
Producibility problems 
Redesign which may require changes in tooling, 
test equipment and/or manufacturing processes 
and may include retrofit . 
Inadequate recoding and restructuring of 
technical information for fitting into the production 
environment 
Ambiguity in defining technical problems to 
properly assess and arrive at a quality solution 
Differences in skills between technicians of 
laboratories and production units 
Availability of special tooling and test equipment 
to achieve high degree of accuracy required 
by componentlsystem part specifications 
Dependence on foreign sources for components1 
items 
Increase in lead times needed to procure critical 
parts and materials 
Low yields due to a high percentage of parts 
that must be scrapped or reworked 
Preparation of a production document. 
These problems manifest themselves in parts 
shortage and in extra labour and machine time to 
rework parts to meet tolerances. 
2. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR 
WEAPON SYSTEMS 
Indian manufacturers who seek know-how, 
generally go to foreign manufacturers and obtain 
complete production know-how (licensed production), 
including equipment, production drawings and 
documents, tooling, etc. Obviously, Indian laboratories 
are expected to provide the kind of technolog~cal 
support, which the preserves of manufacturers' 
abroad. 
An attempt has been made to transfer 
technologies ofhighly sophisticated missiles developed 
under integrated guided missiles development 
programme (IGMDP) to both public sector undertakings 
(PSUs) and private sector manufacturerslfabricators. 
In doing so, concurrency concept has been adopted 
to minimise the time and also to cater for the 
production problems by manufacturing developmental 
umts by production agencles and has been Implemented 
by ~ntroductng vartous production centres to the 
m ~ s s ~ l e  development tasks durtng the early stages 
of development also. The concurrency concept 
has been adopted for smooth technology transfer, 
as it addresses issues simultaneously during development 
and production. 
Conventionally, technology transfer is assisted 
through a technology transfer agentlchampion. Unique 
nature of technology of missiles forbids the 
intervention/interference of a third party. Such 
technologies should be transferred by the developing 
agencies themselves or create mechanisms to do 
so. In sophisticated technologies, acquisition of 
technology in terms of drawings, specifications, 
material, test equipment and procedures, tooling, 
manufacturing process and product as a whole 
may take three to five years, besides political and 
economical overtones. 
There are several steps to be taken before 
technology dseveloped by a laboratory can be 
transformed into production. There may be several 
gaps in the product~on process which neither the 
laboratory nor the manufacturing agencies are able 
to fill. Hence, concurrent mode of technology transfer 
has been adopted to fill the gaps for smooth transition 
from development to full-scale production. Technology 
receiversiprime production agencies have to be 
closely associated with Defence laboratories in 
acquiring technologies. The technologies of this 
class (IGMDP) are normally based on new 
innovationslideas and are radically different from 
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the conventional technologies, normally available 
to the production concerns in terms of software. 
No viable methods are available for horizontal sliding 
of technology from research and development centres 
to production agencies except a concurrent mode 
for meeting some of the significant and essential 
requirements for early deployment of a developed 
weapon system. 
2.1 Strategy for Technology Transfer 
While carrying out technology transfer, the 
strategy followed is: 
Technology transfer connotes the transfer of 
total content of knowledge and hardware and 
know-how of resource management, infrastructure, 
plan product, maintain balance between technical 
concerns and ~roduc t ion  concerns and finallv 
productionise and successfully impart training 
in operation, maintenance and deployment of 
weapon systems. 
For an effective transfer of technical information, 
one must make use of human ability to recode 
and restructure information so that it fits into 
new contents and situations. Consequently, the 
best way to transfer technical information is 
to move a human carrier. 
The involvement of  technology receivers1 
production agencies in  technology transfer 
ranges from superficial input early in the 
development process (where minor alterations 
to the technology were considered), to actual 
development of  partnership between the 
technology source and the receiver for absorption 
of innovations from the beginning. 
It can he inefficient or even risky from the 
beginning of a technology project for technology 
developers and implementation managers, if 
they cannot understand what kind of transfer 
situation they are managing. Similarly, 
manufacturers of new technology need to 
understand through which modes they are receiving, 
in order to allocate resources appropriately, as 
well as to position enough number of production 
personnel. 
Technology transfer was considered as critical 
in development phase and was treated as 
technical discipline problem and received 
balanced treatment with other technical 
disciplines. 
A close and effective communication and strong 
commitment to success are necessary on both 
sides, if technology is to be developed and 
transitioned successfully. 
The production engineering and planning was 
done during full-scale development and the 
production engineers properly planned and 
prepared for production. 
Production risks were identified as early as 
possible, beginning with the first stage of 
development and these risks were minimised 
before production commenced. 
Voids in production technologies were identified 
and addressed. 
Production agencies during development phase 
demonstrated their capabilities to produce the 
item within the estimated cost and time schedule. 
During development, several factors, in particular, 
the design instabilities arising from a highly 
technical  design,  changes in  technical 
requirements, export controls (like Missile 
Treaty Control Regime) of  missile-related 
items in countries abroad, increasing lead 
times needed to procure critical items and 
materials and insufficient resources can hamper 
production preparation and these were taken 
care of. 
Production readiness reviews were conducted 
during the entire span, from development to 
full-scale production, for proper management 
of technology transfer and productionisation. 
For the transfer of technology to take place, 
the receiving organisation was so chosen that 
it was capable of and interested in receiving 
the information. Both donor and receiver 
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overlapped in self-confidence to ask questions 
and really probe the information being 
transmitted. Finally, recipient organisation 
(production agencies) were able to distinguish 
between the changes in processes or techniques 
and changes that were inevitable and permissible 
and those that vitiate the new technology. 
Besides, the research and development (R&D) 
personnel understood the manufacturing 
environment, and also recognised the enormous 
and overriding commitment that manufacturing 
personnel make for achieving uninterrupted 
output. 
The manufacturing agencies were adaptive in 
incorporating new technology. The shop 
environment possess severe constraints in 
adapting new manufacturing techniques and 
new product technologies. New manufacturing 
techniques require learning new skills, create 
anxiety and resentment and change status 
relationships that alter communication patterns. 
Manufacturing personnel have a very limited 
experimental tradition. It can be possible that 
manufacturing personnel, because of professional 
jealousy or scientific jealousy, block the technology 
transfer. Diplomatic approach is needed in 
overcoming such barriers. 
The manufacturing agencies were assisted in 
taking action for early setting up of the needed 
production facilities, test equipment and tooling 
and to overcome production problems during 
development phase. 
The manufacturers generally do  not have 
adequate technical proficiency to be able to 
talk to R&D personnel, as they are not familiar 
with production environment. This makes it 
difficult for R&D personnel to identify and 
characterise the problems of manufacturers. 
Besides, technologists do not understand 
management and that  managers do  not 
understand the technology they manage. Lack 
of common language and techniques for 
identifying technical problems require creation 
of a common platform for solving such problems. 
The manufacturing personnel are not familiar 
with the tradition of professional interaction 
that is common in R&D. Manufacturing personnel 
believe that new technology must be carefully 
tailored to the requirements of local environment 
and understanding. 
Therefore, technology transfer connotes interfaces 
and barriers and overcoming such barriers needs 
involvement of people with a manufacturing background 
in technology development. 
2.2 Methodology 
Production of large-size weapon systems is as 
difficult as their development. Technology transfer 
activities begin with identifying component technologies 
and setting up facilitieslaugmenting facilities. 
Contractors for developmentlfabrication shall be 
identified based on the past performance, production 
management capability, quality history and the potential 
to execute the production programme. 
Bearing above in mind, a four-stage technology 
transfer process was designed and implemented 
to transfer the missile technology from a design 
agency to the production agencies. Technology 
transfer without human carrier is hollow. Technical 
concerned of technology provider designed jointly 
with production concerned of a fabricating company, 
fabricated or constructed prototype according to 
the design specifications and offered to the users 
for inspection (qualification and acceptance) and 
the product was evaluated by all the four parties 
(designer, manufacturer, project team and user). 
In this way, close communication links between 
adjacent activities are institutionalised. A consortium 
of PSUs was adopted. Inspection and maintenance 
agencies were also associated from the development 
stage. Clear definition of technology transfer was 
arrived at. 
The document for technology transfer was 
generated providing appropriate standards, formats, 
procedures and processes, and guidelines in the 
first stage, nurtured during second stages, implemented 
the procedures laid down in the document in the 
third stage and in the final stage, refined the technology 
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Figure 1. Technology transfer process 
by standardising and optimising at regular intervals 
and also at project milestones. A11 details during 
design, development, manufacture and testing were 
captured and documented during the development 
cycle to reduce the problems in technology transfer. 
Fish bone diagram of a technology transfer process 
is shown in Fig. 1. In concurrent modes of technology 
transfer, it is essential to have documents and 
drawings controlled. Procedures were laid down 
to ensure that the task performers are aware of 
the existence and the availability of documents 
governing their tasks. In exercising the transfer 
of entire technical information to the extent possible 
in a codified form, design engineering drawings 
were standardiscd to production standards. 
While imparting the technology in concurrent 
mode, it is necessary to consider requests/suggestions 
made by production and inspection agencies on 
each subsystem for ease of manufacture, adequacy 
of tests for achieving quality product and conformity 
to the specifications. Change-control methodology 
was adopted to bring out various factors into the 
systematic fold of technology transfer. Two review 
mechanisms were adopted, where a component 
deviated from its intended specifications during 
manufacture and post-production deviations during 
testing of components for modifying components. 
These review mechanisms are controlled by various 
committees like Waiver Board, Standing Design 
Review Committee and Document Review Committee 
to control the configuration of weapon systems. 
All the stages of technology transfer process 
were reviewed by preliminary design review committee 
and critical design review committee. Based on 
the input received from the designer, types of documents 
were identified depending on the complexity of 
technology of subsystems. These documents were 
generated, reviewed by production agencies and 
inspection agencies. Development units were fabricated 
by the production agencies based on the documented 
technical information and participation of design 
engineers. These units were tested dynamically 
(test-fired) and had undergone qualification tests. 
The results of these tests were evaluated by a 
competent team and the documentation was updated. 
3 .  RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Using this mode of  technology transfer, 
production risks were identified as early as beginning 
of the first stage of development, and these risks 
were minimised. In a concurrent mode of technology 
." 
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transfer, the advantage is specially in addressing 
the issues (technical and production problems) during 
development. which lead to smooth technology 
transfer from development to production.Production 
Engineer~ng and planning were done throughout 
full-scale development. Voids in production were 
identifled and addressed. Before proceeding into 
full-scale production, contractors had demonstrated 
their capabilities to produce systemsisubsystems 
within the estimated cost and time schedule. Had 
the designs been frozen, there would have been 
little room to introduce changes in the interest 
of producibility. Weapon systems have to be so 
designed to incorporate improvediadvanced (proven) 
technologies during dei~elopment. Al! previously 
tried production processes were adopted which 
could produce components meeting specifications. 
Production engineers were prepared to meet the 
required rate of production w ~ t h  the experience 
gained during developmental periods. Tolerances, 
found rigid and not producible, were addressed 
during the development phase. Unnecessary processes 
and quality tests were eliminated. The sequence 
of production preparations leading to production 
decision is shown in the bar chart Fig. 2. 
. .. n ~ n d i c a a r  full sralc dnclupment derision and 
'h. prndurfion drrision 
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Figure 2. Bar chart showing decisions regarding 
development and production wrt time. 
Production readiness was reviewed by production 
management committee and carried out throughout 
the project. Readiness review had became a 
methodical examination of this programme to verify 
whether the production design, planning and associated 
preparations for a system have progressed to the 
point where a production commitment can be made 
without incurring unacceptable risks. In this 
programme, a nodal production agency h a s  identified 
and made responsible for realisation of subsystems1 
systems and integration 3f the missiles. 
4. SUMMARY 
Technology transfer of the laboratory-developed 
model to productionisation is quite a 'complex 
operation, but it is highly vulnerable when over- 
simplified. Smooth transition from development to 
production (Fig. 3 )  of missiles in the IGMDP is 
due to the following: 
Technical information was communicated quickly 
and widely onto the floor level with minimum 
hierarchy and job classification. Face-to-face 
communication and constant interaction among 
technical/production/inspection personnel and users 
were given paramount importance. A large-size 
weapon system development and production involves 
three or more different organisations. As such, a 
proper mechanism for conflict resolution was worked 
out. Protection of information was abandoned and 
replaced by openness. Cooperation was filtered 
down to managerial and operational personnel, 
which has resulted in smooth transition of technology 
from development to production. Real-time networking 
of related laboratories of the Defence Research 
and Development Organisation (DRDO) and PSUs 
has been planned for improving the technology 
transfer process. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The following are some of the suggestions 
for smooth technology transfer from an R&D 
agency to production agency for hi-technologies1 
weapon systems and could be made as production 
policy for weapon systems: 
(a) Adoption of concurrent engineering for reducing 
cost and time 
(b) Production preparedness should be treated 
as technical discipline problem that must receive 
balanced treatment in development with other 
technical discipline and should be treated as 
critical elements of production phase, such as 
performance and supportability. 
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(c) Emphasis should be placed on application of 
fundamental engineering principles and relevant 
technical disciplines during development and 
production. Assessment of production risks should 
be made throughout the acquisition process. 
These assessments should be formalised through 
production readiness reviews. Risks should be 
reduced to acceptable levels. 
(d) A manufacturing strategy should be developed 
as a part of the programme acquisition strategy. 
Manufacturing voids, deficiencies and dependencies 
on critical foreign source materials should be 
addressed concurrently with concept demonstration 
and validation through the use of manufacturing 
technology projects or other means. The reducibility 
of each system design concept should be evaluated 
at the full-scale development decision point to 
determine if the proposed system can be 
manufactured in compliance with the production 
cost and industrial base goals and thresholds. 
(e) Single production centre (prime production agency) 
should be responsible for integration of weapon 
system components with adequate trained staff. 
( f )  Contractor's past performance (to the extent 
that it has a bearing on the concept involved) 
production management capability, quahty history 
and the potential to execute the production 
programme should be included in the contractual 
solicitations and evaluated thereafter in the 
source selection. 
(g) A comprehensive producibility engineering and 
planning programme is a requisite for entering 
full-scale development. Engineering and planning 
programmes should be conducted throughout 
full-scale development and shall contain specific 
tasks, measurable goals and system of contractor 
accountability. 
(h) A quality programme should be conducted 
throughout acquisition and deployment. Production 
preparedness planning should be integrated 
effectively with production management and 
planning. 
(i) The monitoring committees should conduct reviews 
throughout the process, from the development 
to the production phases. 
6) The manufacturing agency must have at its 
disposal an R&D team working not only on 
improvement of current catalogue of products 
but also on new products and new technological 
absorptions. 
(k) The manufacturers should build-up enough 
expertise to provide valuable feedback on the 
technology transferred to the designers. 
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